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Articles

International Relations Theory and
the Case against Unilateralism
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth

What are the general costs associated with a U.S. shift toward unilateralism? According to the overwhelming majority of international relations (IR) scholars, the costs are very high. We evaluate the key arguments that underlie this assessment, namely that
increased U.S. unilateralism will: (1) spur the formation of a coalition to check U.S. power; (2) reduce efficiency gains through lost
opportunities for institutionalized cooperation; and (3) undermine the legitimacy of the American-led international order. We
conclude that the theoretical arguments that IR scholars advance do not show that a shift toward unilateralism necessarily has high
costs. Our analysis reveals the need to, first, distinguish clearly between criticisms of unilateral policies based on procedure and those
based on substance and, second, to recognize the weakness of current procedural arguments.

.S. policy makers have long been ambivalent about
unilateralism. “The United States has been the greatest champion of multilateral institutions in the twentieth century,” observes G. John Ikenberry, but it has also
“been reluctant to tie itself too closely to these multilateral
institutions and rules.” 1 International relations (IR) scholars, by contrast, have typically touted the benefits of
multilateralism in general and for the United States in
particular, while stressing the heavy costs of unilateralism.
Scholarly concerns about the costs of unilateralism came
to the fore in 2003, when it appeared that President George
W. Bush had made a strategic decision to reduce the United
States’ general commitment to international institutions
in favor of assembling “coalitions of the willing” on an as
needed, case-by-case basis.2 Cutting across issue areas and
individual cases, this seemed to represent a fundamentally
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new foreign policy approach, which analysts dubbed the
“new unilateralism.” 3
The heightened salience of the debate over unilateralism among scholars, policy makers, and pundits shows
every sign of becoming a permanent feature of the American political scene. While the debate encompasses many
different issues, it was the sagacity of going it alone in
security affairs that was most salient in the 2004 election
and is now poised to become the defining foreign policy
distinction between the Democratic and Republican parties. Important though it is, the distinction is one of degree.
Unilateralism and multilateralism are best understood as
two ends of a continuum, and it is a mistake to view any
politician or party as being at one end or the other. The
debate is not about a wholesale abandonment of all multilateral commitments, but rather about the wisdom of moving to a more strategic approach to unilateralism. During
the post–World War II period, American policy makers
commonly saw unilateralism as a last resort, to be pursued
only when multilateralism carried great costs or was impossible. The Bush administration, in contrast, advertised a
greater willingness to go it alone, seeming to view multilateralism much more instrumentally—as a strategy to be
followed when doing so is easy or especially advantageous,
but never as an end in itself, and certainly not one whose
pursuit merits bearing high costs.
This raises a fundamental question: What are the general costs associated with a shift toward unilateralism?
President Bush escaped the most salient, short-term domestic downside—electoral defeat. John Kerry focused his
critique of Bush’s foreign policy on the argument that
American foreign policy had been insufficiently multilateral over the past four years. Bush not only emerged the
victor, but did so in large part because voters judged him
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to be superior on foreign policy issues.4 This underscores
question, current scholarship has no persuasive answer,
the significance of unilateralism’s international costs, long
although scholars routinely write as if it does. The same
a preoccupation of international relations scholars. Our
goes for the related issue of the benefits of multilateralism.
purpose in this article is to determine what leverage IR
Nothing in this article denies that there are areas, such as
theory gives us on this crucial issue.
the environment, where the United States should be more
Notwithstanding their vigorous debates over theory,
multilateral. Rather, the point is that the case for acting
methodology, epistemology, ontology, not to mention other
multilaterally rests on the substance of a given issue, not
aspects of U.S. foreign policy, the overwhelming bulk of
on the purported costs of not doing so.
IR scholars who express views on the subject stress the
high international costs of unilateralism, particularly for
Realism: Counterbalancing and the
the United States today. Stanley Hoffman’s warning that
Costs of Unilateralism
“nothing is more dangerous for a ‘hyperpower’ than the
The most pervasive argument against unilateralism is that
temptation of unilateralism” is typical of scholarly assessit will spark or hasten counterbalancing by other major
ments.5 Significantly, recent criticisms of this kind come
not just from institutionalists and constructivists—whose
powers. The argument is derived from balance-of-power
scholarly writings highlight the importance of intertheory, long a staple of realist thinking and practice.
national institutions—but also from prominent represenRealism’s focus on relative power does explain why the
tatives of the realist theoretical tradition as well.6 To anyone
United States has the opportunity to act unilaterally, and,
familiar with this normally squabbling scholarly commumoreover, some realists discount the importance of internity, such widespread agreement is noteworthy.
national institutions. Nevertheless, influential contempoThe sections that follow evaluate the key arguments
rary formulations of the theory yield the argument that by
that analysts have advanced, namely, that increased U.S.
strongly demonstrating its multilateral credentials, the
unilateralism will (1) spur the formation of a coalition
United States can signal benign intent and thus forestall
to check U.S. power; (2) reduce efficiency gains through
counterbalancing. In making this argument, contempolost opportunities for institutionalized cooperation; and
rary realists are in distinguished historical company, for
(3) undermine the legitimacy of the American-led interanticipated counterbalancing has long been the strongest
national order. These claims roughly correspond to the
realist argument for restraint.9 More than any other intellectual factor, this accounts for the similarity between many
three major schools of IR theory: realism, institutionalrealists’ preferences regarding unilateralism and those of
ism, and constructivism. Although we discuss analysts
their institutionalist and constructivist counterparts.
whose writings are emblematic of the arguments associBalance-of-power theory posits that because states have
ated with each theoretical school, our goal is not to clasan interest in maximizing their long-term odds on sursify and analyze individuals. Many scholars cross theoretical
vival, they will coordinate to check dangerous concentraboundaries. Moreover, discussions of international relations of power.10 If the security threat to others inheres in
tions theories have become common in the larger foreign
power potential alone, as Kenneth Waltz maintains, then
policy debate among policy makers and nonacademic
there is nothing Washington can do to affect the probapublic commentators,7 yet the respective theories are
often employed very differbility and rate of
ently depending upon the parcounterbalancing.11
The
question
is
whether
punishing
general
If, however, other
tisanship of the individual in
states assess America’s
question.8 Nevertheless, polcosts accrue to policies that are unilateral
icy makers often make the
intentions as well as
same general arguments about
its capabilities when
regardless of their substance. On that
the costs of unilateralism that
deciding whether to
scholars stress in their analyses.
balance, as Stephen
question, current scholarship has no
We conclude that the curWalt and many other
rent theoretical arguments do
realists argue, then
persuasive answer, although scholars
not show that a shift toward
U.S. policy makers
unilateralism necessarily has
can use support for
routinely write as if it does.
high costs. Needless to say, this
international instituconclusion is not an endorsetions to demonstrate
ment of all unilateral policies. Any policy may be wise or
their satisfaction with the status quo and dampen other
unwise, and many policies followed by the Bush adminstates’ security fears, thus forestalling the emergence of a
istration doubtless fall into the latter category. The quescounterbalancing coalition.12
Many self-described realists accept the proposition that
tion is whether punishing general costs accrue to policies
the United States can and should reduce the probability
that are unilateral regardless of their substance. On that
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of counterbalancing by maintaining a general disposition
toward multilateralism. Walt argues that “the United
Nations and other international institutions help the
United States exercise its power in a way that is less
threatening (and therefore more acceptable) to others.” 13
Michael Mastanduno explicitly derives from Walt’s balance of threat theory the proposition that “the dominant
state in a unipolar setting will rely on multilateralism in
its international undertakings.” 14 Randall Schweller and
David Priess agree, noting that “if the hegemon adopts a
benevolent strategy and creates a negotiated order based
on legitimate influence and management, lesser states
will bandwagon with rather than balance against it.” 15
The importance of the balancing proposition cannot
be overstated, for it also figures crucially in the arguments of nonrealist scholars. When institutionalists and
constructivists assess the costs of unilateralism, expected
counterbalancing by other states often figures prominently.16 Moreover, the balance-of-power metaphor is a staple
of punditry, both in the United States and abroad, in
which each new effort at coordination among major powers that excludes Washington is routinely hailed as an
epoch-making “axis.” Indeed, the leaders of other major
powers—notably the presidents of France, Russia, and
China—periodically seem to invoke the balancing proposition themselves, arguing that their policies are intended
to foster a multipolar world.
This confluence of theoretical expectations, journalistic
commentary, and political rhetoric lends initial plausibility to the balancing proposition and partly explains its
popularity as an argument against unilateralism. The argument hinges on the proposition that the more the United
States backs away from multilateralism, the greater the
probability of counterbalancing. The problem is that there
is no counterbalancing against the United States, nor is
there likely to be any time soon. Indeed, the remarkable
thing about the current international system is that three
key causal factors highlighted by realist balance-of-power
theory itself are configured so as to make the reemergence
of traditional balancing dynamics among the major powers highly improbable.17
First is geography. The counterbalancing coalitions of
the past all emerged against centrally located land powers
that constituted existential threats to nearby major states.
The United States, by contrast, lies far from the shores of
Eurasia, where the other major powers are all clustered.
Distance mutes the potential security threat U.S. power
poses to others, while proximity magnifies the potential
threat their power poses to one another and thus increases
the salience of local as opposed to global counterbalancing.
The geographical uniqueness of the current international system and its implications for balancing are
now widely appreciated.18 This is partly true of the second key factor: the distribution of material capabilities.
It is now commonplace to observe that the gap in overall

power between the United States and all other states is
larger now than any analogous gap in the history of the
modern states system.19 Analysts are also sensitive to decisive U.S. advantages in the individual components of
national power: military, technological, economic, and
even demographic.20 Historically minded observers are
aware that all preceding leading states were dominant
militarily or economically, but never both simultaneously. Less widely appreciated is the gap in latent
power.21 States make choices about balancing depending
on their expectations of the capabilities prospective balancers could produce in extremis. The United States is in a
better position than past leading states to enhance its
capabilities vis-à-vis putative rivals for two reasons: it
obtains its currently dominant military capabilities by
devoting a historically small proportion of its economy
to national defense (less than 4 percent of GDP in 2004
as compared to 5–14 percent during the cold war); and
its historically large technological lead is a potential
resource that could be further exploited. And these underlying advantages interact with the perennial problem
would-be balancers face: they must coordinate policies in
complex ways to increase capabilities against a hegemon
whose response is coordinated by a single government.
The third key factor is that American primacy is an
accomplished fact rather than a revisionist aspiration. Many
observers now recognize that other key powers derive benefits from the status quo and so may be reluctant to pay
costs to overthrow it.22 Less recognized is that for three
centuries no balance-of-power theorist ever developed propositions about a system in which hegemony is the status
quo. All the historical experience of balancing from the
seventeenth century until 1991 concerns efforts to check
a rising power from attaining hegemony. While both history and balance-of-power theory clearly suggest that a
rising potential hegemon needs to be concerned about the
counterbalancing constraint, neither yields this implication for a hegemon that is already firmly established. On
the contrary, both theory and historical experience suggest that when hegemony is the status quo, all the familiar
obstacles to balancing will be dramatically magnified. Chief
among these are the much higher coordination challenges
putative counterbalancers would face today, in comparison with their predecessors. Classical balancing coalitions
were always vulnerable to the collective action problem, as
members would seek to ride free on the efforts of others.
Those challenges would be multiplied in any attempt to
counterbalance the United States today.
These factors characterize an international system that
is already primed against traditional power balancing due
to nuclear weapons and the declining economic and military value of territory. All the major powers have or can
quickly produce nuclear weapons. With a secure secondstrike capability, their territorial integrity is better secured
than that of any past great power, and the security threat
September 2005 | Vol. 3/No. 3 511
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inherent in concentrated power is diminished.23 Moreover, the economic and military benefits of owning specific bits of land have declined dramatically, reducing the
incentives for conquest and diminishing the core security
threat posed by concentrated power.24
Taken individually, each of these factors militates against
counterbalancing. Together they make it exceedingly
unlikely, for there is considerable positive interaction among
them. American preponderance in the material scales of
world power feeds the collective action and coordination
problems, as do geography and the status quo barrier.
Other schools of IR research yield additional reasons to
doubt the salience of counterbalancing today.25 But the
key is that all of the factors highlighted here lie within the
realist system of explanation that highlights anarchy and
its attendant security problems. Even discounting the
importance of factors such as shared democratic norms
and institutions, there is no reason to expect the reemergence of traditional balancing dynamics in the current
international system. It follows that whatever the costs of
unilateralism are, counterbalancing is not among them.
Looking for “soft balancing”
IR scholars are increasingly coming to recognize the absence
of traditional great-power balancing since the end of the
cold war.26 In response, realists have shifted their argument, claiming that under unipolarity, balancing dynamics emerge more subtly in the form of “soft balancing,” as
it is typically called.27 T. V. Paul provides a concise definition of this concept:
Soft balancing involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances.
It occurs when states generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially
threatening state or a rising power. Soft balancing is often based
on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies
may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when
security competition becomes intense and the powerful state
becomes threatening.28

Judging by recent scholarship and commentary, soft
balancing is beginning to replace conventional “hard” balancing as the most popular argument for U.S. restraint in
the face of the temptations of power. Scholars who cite
soft balancing to explain their opposition to U.S. unilateral actions defend their prescription as flowing from a
venerable line of theory and empirical research, not just
from different policy preferences. For the many analysts
who now use the concept, soft balancing is not just a
tactic for issue-specific policy disputes and diplomatic bargaining, but a reflection of the fact that the United States
has so much power within the international system. They
argue that by undermining confidence in America’s willingness to bind its power, unilateralism brings to the fore
otherwise latent concerns about the security threat that
512
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U.S. capabilities pose. These security fears then drive other
states’ willingness to absorb costs to check the United States.
Many conceptual and empirical issues remain to be
addressed concerning soft-balancing. There is no dispute
that many actions adopted by other states end up constraining Washington, that is, they make it harder for the
United States to advance its foreign policy goals, including military security. But what is driving these actions?
Are they really responses to U.S. unilateralism? Have unilateral U.S. actions actually triggered other states’ sensitivity to the underlying security threat represented by the
concentration of power in the United States? According
to the many realists who have developed the soft-balancing
concept, the answer to these questions is yes. The problem
is that these scholars reached this judgment without examining alternative explanations for the behavior they attribute
to soft balancing. States have many reasons besides fear of
U.S. power to enhance their capabilities—to address
regional security issues, for example. To evaluate the softbalancing argument, other state motivations need to be
analyzed to avoid reaching biased conclusions.29
In our review of the evidence and the experts’ literature,
we found no indication that U.S. unilateral policies figured in three of the four key cases cited by soft-balancing
proponents: Russian assistance to Iranian nuclear efforts,
European military coordination, and Russia’s strategic partnerships with India and China. Russia’s nuclear sales to
Iran are driven by economic concerns. Profit is also a key
motive in Russia’s relationships with its Asian partners,
though mutual efforts to enhance security on local and
regional issues such as drug trafficking and terrorism also
figure. And the European Union’s efforts to beef up its
joint military capability is almost entirely a response to a
perceived need to be able to address regional security issues
along the lines of the 1990s crisis in the Balkans.
Only in the fourth case—opposition to the Iraq war—
can one credibly argue that U.S. unilateralism may have
contributed to a soft-balancing response. After all, much
of the issue ostensibly hinged on whether or not the UN
Security Council would put its multilateral imprimatur
on a U.S.-led invasion. One feature that distinguished
this transatlantic dispute from all predecessors during the
post-1945 era was the position of Germany, traditionally
among the most stalwart of Washington’s European allies.
Germany’s early and adamant opposition was crucial in
propelling other states’ resistance to U.S. policy. The key
is that Germany’s Gerhard Schroeder made it clear he
would work against an invasion whether the Security Council approved it or not.30 In short, it was not the procedure,
but the substance of the policy that resonated with the
German opposition. Moreover, Germany’s uncompromising stance was propelled by long-standing domestic political dynamics. Facing defeat at the polls, Schroeder used
his antiwar stance to recapture two key left-wing constituencies, both of which had always had strong antiwar

preferences: core Social Democratic Party activists, and
left-wing voters in eastern Germany who were defecting
to the pacifist and anti-American Party of Democratic
Socialism (the former Communists).31
Ultimately, the soft-balancing argument seems plausible in this case mainly because France did state its opposition to U.S. policy in procedural terms, insisting on the
need for a multilateral approach through the Security
Council. However, even for France, U.S. unilateralism was
hardly the only factor in play. President Jacques Chirac
and most of the French policy establishment opposed
regime change on policy grounds. They expected that an
occupation of Iraq would be so bloody and long as to
make the problem of al Qaeda style terrorism worse, with
potentially baleful implications for France’s own security,
especially given its substantial Moslem minority.32 Moreover, having just weathered a touch-and-go reelection in
which he won only 19 percent in the first round, Chirac
detected political advantages in adopting an extremely popular policy position. Standing up to the United States
generally gains support in France, and opposing the Iraq
war was especially popular with Muslim voters.
European regional dynamics also argued for an antiwar
stance. At a time when the European Union faced numerous new challenges stemming from its expansion, Chirac
could not afford to lose the policy initiative to Schroeder.
Notwithstanding these incentives for opposing U.S. policy, there were also reasons to compromise. French leaders
preferred a low-key approach to this issue and did actively
seek to avoid the discord they knew would accompany an
attempt at a second UN resolution. The inter-allied wrangling over Iraq ended up playing itself out in the UN
Security Council not because France sought to enlist that
institution in a soft-balancing strategy, but because Tony
Blair insisted on seeking a second resolution for domestic
reasons of his own.33 Had it not been for this unique
domestic contingency, a Washington-Paris deal might have
been struck, thereby avoiding a dramatic diplomatic
contretemps.
In sum, both hard and soft balancing initially appears
as a strong argument rooted in IR theory for the high
costs of unilateralism. Closer examination reveals its weakness. There is no indication that other states are going to
coordinate to check American power to force Washington
to be multilateral.

Institutionalist Theory: Risking
the Efficiency Gains of an
Institutionalized Hegemony
The second scholarly argument against increased unilateralism is that it threatens major reductions in the efficiency gains that can be realized from institutionalized
cooperation. The theoretical underpinnings of this argument lie mainly in institutionalist theory (or liberal insti-

tutionalism, as it is sometime called).34 Highly relevant to
the debate over unilateralism is a general proposition that
emerges from this literature: multilateral institutions facilitate efficient hegemony. To the extent that the tendency
to go it alone erodes cooperation within such institutions,
critics allege, it imposes significant costs, or, more accurately, results in foregone gains. It follows that a rational
hegemon might be willing to forsake some autonomous
decision-making power in favor of multilateral institutions in exchange for cooperation on issues it simply cannot address on its own, as well as for lower overall costs in
maintaining order.
Institutionalist theory builds on the observation that
global problems beyond the control of individual countries
cannot be managed in the absence of institutional structures that establish standards for state action and monitor
compliance.35 Even though U.S. power is unprecedented,
the argument goes, so too is the level of interdependence,
which means that the list of global problems that America
cannot resolve on its own will continue to grow, increasing
the benefits of multilateralism over the long run.36 The argument that institutions are efficient is strengthened to the
extent that effective cooperation on an issue requires binding rules where state compliance must be monitored.37
The theory also identifies ways by which multilateral
institutions can make cooperation more efficient even on
matters that the United States could conceivably resolve
on its own or by using ad hoc bilateral arrangements or
loose coalitions. For example, having an institution in place
to facilitate cooperation on one issue makes it easier, and
more likely, that the participating states will be able to
achieve cooperation rapidly on a related issue.38 Consider
the intelligence sharing network within NATO, which
was originally designed to gather information on the threat
from the Soviet Union: once in place, it could later quickly
be adapted to deal with new unforeseen issues, such as the
threat from terrorism.
Institutionalist theory provides a compelling argument
that the United States derives significant efficiency gains
from the web of international institutions in the world
today, much of which was created at the behest of U.S.
policy makers in the decades following World War II.39
However, even if we accept the essential propositions of
institutionalist theory at face value, they represent only
one side of the equation: institutionalization also has potential downsides for the United States. Skeptics argue that
institutionalization entails major costs. For example, just
before he joined the Bush administration, John Bolton
warned:
The costs [of global governance] to the United States—reduced
constitutional autonomy, impaired popular sovereignty, reduction of our international power, and limitations on our domestic
and foreign policy options and solutions—are too great, and the
current understanding of these costs far too limited, to be acceptable. Whether we are ready or not, the debate over global
September 2005 | Vol. 3/No. 3 513
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governance, fought at the confluence of constitutional theory
and foreign policy, is the decisive issue facing the United States
internationally.40

Analysts and practitioners who defend unilateralism are
particularly concerned that international institutions might
reduce the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. Many
writings by IR scholars assume that the benefits of multilateralism in military operations outweigh the costs.41 The
potential benefits clearly are substantial: common war plans,
specialization of military tasks, sharing of burdens and
risks, economies of scale, common equipment and interchangeable parts, and so on. But defenders of unilateralism argue that those benefits have declined with the
dramatic increase in U.S. military power, which devalues
the substantive contributions of other states and renders
joint operations involving military units from the United
States and many of its allies difficult or even impossible.42
And this new “inter-operability” problem is in addition to
the well-known costs of slow decision making, loss of
secrecy, cumbersome systems of command and control,
and circumscribed freedom of action. Defenders of unilateralism cite the 1999 war in Kosovo as a key example:
because the United States had to coordinate with NATO,
they argue, the operational effectiveness of this mission
was compromised.43 It is in large part due to the legacy of
Kosovo that U.S. policy makers decided to spurn virtually
all offers of military assistance from NATO countries during the 2001 war in Afghanistan.44
Critics also argue that multilateralism has significant
credibility costs. Deterrence demands a reputation for
resolve and a credible threat of a swift response to an
adversary’s transgression. As Ruth Wedgewood puts the
critics’ case: “If adversaries (including rogue regimes) were
able to rely on the blocking mechanisms of multilateral
machinery, the global regime for governing the use of force
could end up causing international conflict rather than
quelling it.” 45 In Kosovo, for example, NATO’s cumbersome procedures meant that it was impossible for Slobodan Milosevic to determine whether a military response
was forthcoming.46 Given America’s capability and apparent willingness to deal with security issues throughout the
globe, Wedgewood argues, other states and nonstate actors
might be wise to exempt it from accepted multilateral
rules governing the use of force in some cases.
Assessing the costs and benefits of institutionalization
It is thus clear that institutionalization has both costs and
benefits for the United States. Critics of unilateralism stress
the efficiency gains of multilateral cooperation, the growing list of global issues that the United States cannot address
without such cooperation, and the corrosive effects of
Washington’s selective disengagement from multilateral
institutions. Supporters stress the coordination costs of
multilateralism and assert that the United States’ massive
514
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military and economic preponderance means that in their
own self interest other states cannot afford to withdraw
cooperation in issue areas the U.S. favors, such as trade, in
retaliation for Washington’s “a la carte” approach to multilateralism. This debate raises two key questions.
First, how large are the coordination costs highlighted
by advocates of unilateralism? More specifically, how great
are these coordination costs relative to the efficiency gains
of institutionalized cooperation? There is strong theoretical and empirical support for the notion that the gains
from institutionalized cooperation are dramatic: this is
made clear in the countless examinations by IR scholars
and others of issues such as the global economy, the environment, disease, space, and global communications networks. In comparison, we have almost no theoretical and
empirical base on which to judge the significance of coordination costs. Scholars have long recognized that coordination costs exist within international institutions,47 but
there has been very little attention to this issue in the most
recent theoretical work on international institutions.48 Concerning empirical cases, defenders of unilateralism routinely cite the experience of Kosovo as clear evidence that
coordination costs are now very large relative to the benefits of cooperation in security issues. But this case may be
unrepresentative and, moreover, the strong conclusions
that they draw from it have not gone unchallenged.49 The
more general problem is that the two sides in the debate
are largely talking past each other: those who stress the
efficiency gains of institutionalized cooperation generally
highlight economic matters and not security issues, while
those who emphasize the significance of coordination costs
do the opposite.50
The second question concerns bargaining power. Supporters of unilateralism advance several arguments based
on the proposition that the United States is so powerful
that it can have just the international institutions it wants
and need not defer to any it does not want. They assert
that the United States can reduce its commitment to international institutions it does not favor, such as the United
Nations and the International Criminal Court, without
having other countries reduce their commitments to institutions Washington does favor, like the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. They also
assume that the United States is so powerful that it can
generate the multilateral cooperation it needs precisely on
its own terms, as long as it is willing to go it alone if
necessary. This line of argument places great stock in a
“fait accompli” strategy for achieving international cooperation: in this view, when a hegemon (in this case, the
United States) stakes out a clear position and says it will
act, others will ultimately fall in line. As Charles Krauthammer puts it,
[U]nilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. When George
Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, “this will not

stand,” and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if
necessary, that declaration—and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally—in and of itself created a coalition
. . . No one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is
sailing.51

This is the underlying basis for Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz’s statement that “the difference is not unilateralist versus multilateralist, it’s whether you lead or
not.” 52
These may well be the central claims of those who champion the unilateral option. If the United States can selectively alter or pull back from those particular international
institutions that it finds overly constraining and force the
multilateral cooperation it needs at or near its “ideal point”—
all without other states imposing significant costs by withdrawing cooperation in other areas—then it can enjoy the
perquisite of the powerful: to have its cake and eat it too, by
getting the efficiency gains of multilateral institutions without paying the costs of reduced policy autonomy.The United
States, in this view, would not exit the institutional order
altogether, but rather use its go-it-alone power to shape international institutions more to its advantage.
In the current context, the United States often has asymmetric bargaining power: it frequently suffers the least if
multilateral cooperation fails. Faced with a set of bargaining games over the shape of post–cold war institutions,
America’s recent unilateralism can be seen as an attempt
to establish the credibility of its asymmetric bargaining
power. In this view, it sometimes must demonstrate its
“asymmetric outside option” in order to influence the bargaining that takes place within multilateral institutions.53
The critics’ reply is that the Bush team radically overestimated its capabilities, as other states will use issue linkage to exact retribution for U.S. unilateralism. Can IR
theory help determine who is right? On the crucial question of bargaining power, current scholarship unfortunately does not provide much help. The literature is rich
with case studies that suggest different answers to the question of U.S. bargaining power. Some cases suggest very
high costs for U.S. unilateralism, while others reach the
opposite finding.54 The problem may be that this research
is done without a theoretical framework that directly
addresses the fundamental issue of America’s asymmetric
bargaining power.55 Institutionalist theory has tended to
neglect how institutions act as “forums for bargaining to
resolve distributional conflicts between states.” 56 Moreover, institutionalist theory is still coming to grips analytically with the implications of unipolarity: the rise of
American primacy happened to coincide with a general
wane in interest among institutionalist scholars about the
role of hegemonic power in institutionalized cooperation.57 As a result, the current debate is framed by fairly
certain findings derived from established theory and based
on empirical research from earlier periods that is challenged by new and as yet untested arguments about the

implications of American power. Even the latest and most
sophisticated efforts of institutionalists have not yet risen
to this analytical challenge.58 The larger problem is that
relative bargaining power may ultimately be hard to measure except in the context of actual costly political struggles.
Where does this leave us? It is clear that certain collective goods may be underprovided in the absence of hegemonic leadership and, moreover, that it can help to
promote multilateral cooperation.59 This would seem to
support the basic position of Krauthammer and Wolfowitz. That being said, institutionalists stress that a hegemon must maintain a reputation for multilateralism in
order to gain cooperation from weaker states.60 A hegemon must credibly bind itself, the argument goes, for a
simple reason: “The more that a powerful state is capable
of dominating or abandoning weaker states, the more the
weaker states will care about constraints on the leading
state’s policy autonomy.” 61 If America’s ability to secure
cooperation from other states does depend upon the extent
to which it maintains a strong reputation for multilateralism, then a fait accompli strategy will only be effective at
promoting international cooperation when America has
made a strong commitment to the very international institutions that serve to constrain and bind its power. This
might explain why the strong leadership position taken by
George H. W. Bush vis-à-vis Iraq in 1991 facilitated multilateral cooperation, yet the opposite result occurred when
George W. Bush did the same in 2003.
Looking beyond the implications for the fait accompli
strategy, the significance of reputation within institutionalist theory points to a powerful admonition against unilateralism. As Ikenberry notes, the fundamental danger is
that by “violating core multilateral rules and norms, the
credibility of American commitment to the wider array of
agreements and norms becomes suspect and the entire
multilateral edifice crumbles.” 62 According to some prominent institutionalists, this is far from being a remote prospect. As Lisa Martin argues,
Reputations can be squandered quickly, and the reputation for
multilateralism surely has been. Turning to multilateral organizations only under duress and when it appears convenient demonstrates a lack of commitment, even explicit rejection, of the
principles of multilateralism. This in turn leads other states to
expect the United States to renege on agreements or operate
outside the constraints of multilateral organizations when it is
convenient to do so. This hollows out the core of such organizations. . . . Without self-binding by the hegemon, multilateral
organizations become empty shells. . . . The U.S. reputation for
self-binding has been largely destroyed and will need to be rebuilt
if these organizations are to regain their effectiveness.63

This argument that the institutional order is imperiled
if the United States does not strongly invest in maintaining a multilateral reputation is a potentially powerful caution against succumbing to the unilateral temptation, but
it ultimately rests on weak theoretical foundations. Despite
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the fact that reputation “now stands as the linchpin of the
dominant neoliberal institutionalist theory of decentralized cooperation,” it remains woefully underdeveloped as
a concept.64 In the most detailed theoretical analysis to
date of the role that reputation plays within international
institutions, George Downs and Michael Jones decisively
undermine the institutionalist conception of reputation.
As they note, institutionalist theory rests on the notion
that “states carry a general reputation for cooperativeness
that determines their attractiveness as a treaty partner both
now and in the future . . . A defection in connection with
any agreement will impose reputation costs that affect all
current and future agreements.” 65 But, they object, no
theoretical justification has been provided in the literature
to back up this institutionalist view that a state possesses
“a single reputation for cooperation that characterizes its
expected reliability in connection with every agreement to
which it is party.” 66
Drawing on rational choice theory, Downs and Jones show
that a far more compelling theoretical case can be made that
states have multiple reputations—each particular to a specific agreement or issue area. For this reason, they find that
“the reputational consequences of defection are usually more
bounded” than institutionalist scholarship currently presumes.” 67 If America has, for example, one reputation associated with the UN and another regarding the WTO, then
lack of compliance with the former organization will in no
way directly undercut its ability to gain cooperation in the
latter. As Downs and Jones note, viewing states as having
multiple reputations “helps to explain why, despite the prevalence of the unitary reputation assumption, examples of a
state’s defection from an agreement in one area (for example, environment) jeopardizing its reputation in every other
area (for example, trade and security) are virtually nonexistent in the literature.” 68 This conclusion is consistent with
the two most detailed studies of reputation in IR, which
decisively undercut the notion that states have a general reputation that will strongly influence how other states relate
across different issue areas.69
In the end, the current lack of an empirical or theoretical justification for the notion that states carry a single
reputation means that we have no basis for accepting the
institutionalists’ argument that America must endorse multilateralism across the board because to do otherwise has
consequences that endanger the entire institutional order.
That, together with theory’s lack of purchase on the issues
of coordination costs and bargaining power, invalidates
the institutionalist argument about the high cost of
unilateralism.

Constructivism: Legitimate Hegemony
and the Dangers of Unilateralism
The third main argument scholars have advanced against
U.S. unilateralism is that it undermines the legitimacy of
516

Perspectives on Politics

the American-led international order, threatening escalating costs for Washington.70 Within IR scholarship this
argument follows seamlessly from writings in the constructivist school, which highlights the social and psychological
foundations of any power relationship.71 Christian ReusSmit succinctly summarizes the core claims, namely, “that
all political power is deeply embedded in webs of social
exchange and mutual constitution; that stable political
power—the sort that escapes the short-term vagaries of coercion and bribery to assume a structural, taken-for-granted
form—ultimately rests on legitimacy; and that institutions
play a crucial role in sustaining such power.” 72
More generally, constructivists argue that institutions
are “the chief legitimizing agents of global politics.” 73 The
precise mechanisms by which institutions perform this
role are not always clearly specified, but the signature constructivist argument is that institutions shape the environment in which actors are socialized to the existing order,
fostering actors’ internalization of the norms and precepts
underlying it.74 They do this by inculcating theories of
reality, establishing the frames of reference by which actors
define the problems they face, and shaping the range of
solutions they consider. Over time, these cognitive and
social patterns become habitual, leading actors—in the
case at hand—to accept the premises of the U.S.-led international order as their own.75 Actors may so internalize
cognitive and social habits supporting the status quo that
it becomes unquestioned and taken for granted. Thus as
long as hegemony is widely seen as legitimate, constructivist scholarship stresses, a large range of possible antihegemonic behaviors and strategies are never considered.
The bottom line is that hegemony without legitimate
authority is likely to be nasty, brutish, and short. “Coalitions of the willing” are not permanent; they last only as
long as the carrots and sticks necessary to maintain them.
Unless it is ready to bear the long-term costs of a world in
which every act of deference must be purchased or coerced,
the United States must seek to maintain legitimacy. But
legitimacy is not free. Constructivists emphasize that the
United States has to earn it by acting in accordance with
the institutions and rules of the order it fostered, even—
indeed, especially—when so doing contradicts its own
immediate interests.76 When it goes unilateral, Bruce Cronin explains, the United States “fails to act within the
boundaries established by its role, [and] the credibility of
the institutions it helped establish weakens . . . When these
organizations are undermined, the legitimacy of the international order is threatened. If this persists over time, the
hegemonic order declines.” 77
If going it alone threatens to reduce the legitimacy of
the international order, then how can we explain the appeal
of unilateralism to U.S. policy makers? Constructivists
have only just begun to examine recent American unilateralism, but their scholarship does suggest two possible
answers to this question.

First, a logical extension of constructivist writings is
that U.S. policy makers are liable to underestimate the
value of the current institutional order and hence the downside risks of unilateralism. The habitual quality of a legitimate institutional order that constructivists highlight
obviously has implications not only for subordinate states,
but also for the hegemon itself. Just as subordinate actors
may come to take for granted the many ways in which the
existing order benefits the hegemon, the hegemon may do
so as well. More specifically, the hegemon may be prone
to focus on the bothersome aspects of the institutionallegal-normative order at the expense of its manifold benefits. Bush administration officials often chafe at the ways
international institutions hamstring the United States.78
To make this argument, they highlight institutions such
as the International Criminal Court, the Ottawa Treaty
on landmines, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—
all of which, they correctly argue, restrict U.S. foreign
policy autonomy.
But such arguments fail to appreciate the full range of
institutions, including those long-standing, informal ones
so deeply embedded that their role in the efficient operation of U.S. hegemony is scarcely even considered by the
nation’s policy makers. It matters greatly, for example, that
Germany and Japan generally follow the U.S. lead in the
IMF; there is no necessary reason that this long-standing
pattern of deference needs to continue in the future. Not
surprisingly, policy makers do not spend much mental
energy cataloging why events go well with little or no
effort. As a result, the ways in which the institutional
structure stymies or thwarts U.S. policy get much more
attention than its role in enabling the United States to
achieve cooperation with many countries efficiently.
Second, constructivists emphasize that if U.S. policy
makers neglect the social wellsprings of power, they are
likely to regard the institutional order as being more stable
than it actually is—and hence to underestimate unilateralism’s risks. As Ned Lebow warns, “[T]he standing of the
United States may be much more precarious than most. . . .
members of the national security community recognize.” 79 The specter of a hegemonic legitimacy crisis looms
especially large for constructivists because of the ways they
depart from rational choice assumptions. For them, the
existing order is not sustained by self-interested costbenefit calculations alone. Rather, it is accepted as an
unquestioned social fact. If actors were to revert to a caseby-case, cost-benefit approach to cooperating under each
aspect of the existing order, it would be far more costly to
all concerned. More importantly, the institutional-legalnormative order influences how states define their interests in the first place. Once the legitimacy of the order is
in question, interests may shift quickly and unpredictably.
Constructivists’ core claim is that subordinate states do
not necessarily maximize their current material interests
when acting according to the precepts of an accepted order.

Although constructivists do not draw this inference, it
follows that states also may not heed immediate material
self-interest when they begin to question that order. If the
hegemon tramples upon deeply held conventions, others
might retaliate in ways that are very costly in terms of
their near-term material interests. The result could be a
cascading crisis in all or at least part of the order, leading,
at best, to much higher leadership costs for the hegemon
or, worse, to its downfall.
Assessing the legitimacy costs of unilateralism
Constructivist scholarship thus renders a starkly negative
verdict for unilateralism: going it alone is dangerous for
the legitimacy of the international order, and this behavior can only be explained by an American failure to appreciate the order’s benefits or its fragility, or both. That a
hegemon needs legitimacy is undeniable. All of history’s
powerful states have sought it, and there is no reason to
believe that the United States is somehow exempt from
this rule. Nevertheless, the existing constructivist literature does not provide an adequately specified argument
for why unilateralism is costly. Put simply, the connection
between unilateralism and legitimacy is much more complex than the current constructivist treatments allow.
Though constructivism is the branch of scholarship most
concerned with legitimacy, thus far only a few scholars
working in this tradition have directly addressed the question of how hegemons in general, and the United States in
particular, can acquire and lose it. As a result, the precise
connections between legitimacy and American unilateralism have yet to be addressed.
Three crucial aspects of the potential legitimacy costs
of American unilateralism have so far been neglected in
constructivist scholarship. The first is obvious but often
overlooked: some kinds of unilateral actions threaten legitimacy more than others. If the unilateral act itself eventually comes to be seen as having produced a public good,
then its legitimacy costs might be negligible or nonexistent. Indeed, the more positively the relevant states evaluate the consequences of unilateralist behavior, the smaller
the legitimacy costs are likely to be, and vice versa. More
generally, unilateral acts come in many forms and occur in
many circumstances.80 A hegemon may act unilaterally by
doing something others do not want it to do, or by not
doing something they expect it to do. A unilateral act may
be a one-shot response to special circumstances with no
likelihood of setting a precedent, or it may represent an
attempt to create a new rule. It may occur on an issue that
is deeply institutionalized or one where relatively few strong
institutions exist. All of these factors will influence whether
and to what degree a unilateral act is legitimacy-reducing.
Second, to the extent that a unilateral act does reduce
legitimacy, compensating strategies may mitigate the
damage. Constructivist scholarship outlines a set of
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mechanisms that sustain legitimate hegemony. Unrecognized in this literature thus far is that these same mechanisms could serve the hegemon as strategies to mitigate
any legitimacy costs of unilateralism. Compensating mechanisms come in both cheap and expensive forms. An example of the former is diplomatic process. A hegemon might,
for example, try to persuade others of the necessity or
sagacity of the unilateral act, or to frame it as consistent
with legitimate norms other than multilateralism.81 It might
also demonstrably reaffirm other salient norms associated
with the order—for example, by consulting with allies.
The key issue here is not whether the hegemon ultimately
gets to decide what to do; rather, it is whether it is willing
to take the time and effort to inform others, especially its
allies, and listen to and discuss their concerns. A more
expensive way a hegemon can reaffirm the benefits of its
leadership is by enhancing the provision of public goods.82
Even if a unilateral action is not viewed positively, its effect
on the hegemon’s legitimacy may be counterbalanced if it
undertakes efforts to provide public goods in other areas.
The less self-interested the United States seems in general,
the less likely other states are to question the entire international order in response to specific unilateral actions.
In the view of many critics, the Bush administration
fell short on both kinds of compensating strategies. Even
as the administration was widely seen to be increasingly
unilateral in 2001–3, U.S. officials frequently used “a language and diplomatic style that seemed calculated to offend
the world.” 83 Moreover, international travel by senior Bush
administration officials to consult with key allies sank to
an unprecedented low compared to the experience of the
previous several administrations.84 Bush did seek to persuade others that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq
were public goods. But other actions—such as the steel
tariffs imposed in 2002 or the attempt in early 2003 to
single-handedly block an agreement to allow poor countries to purchase generic medicines to fight diseases such
as AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis—undermined that message. It follows that the apparent legitimacy losses suffered
by the United States in recent years may result less from
unilateralism itself than from a failure to pursue compensating strategies energetically enough.
Related to this is the third and most important point:
unilateralism can potentially produce legitimacy benefits
for the hegemon. Standards of legitimacy can change. Powerful states can sometimes create new rules to legitimate
new practices that they find meet their interests. If the
hegemon wants to renegotiate parts of the institutionalnormative-legal order, but other states disagree with the
new rules it supports, the stage is set for high-stakes bargaining. In such bargaining, one way for the hegemon to
exploit its asymmetric power is to threaten to go it alone.
As Lloyd Gruber demonstrates, powerful states can sometimes use go-it-alone power to create a new status quo,
which other states initially do not agree with but eventu518
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ally decide they want to participate in.85 Because constructivist scholarship highlights the potentially powerful “lockin” effects that follow from general acceptance of a new
norm, rule, or institution, it magnifies the stakes in this
general bargaining game. The massive potential long-term
benefits of winning legitimacy for the new practices it
favors may induce a far-sighted hegemon to accept considerable near-term costs and risks. Hence even if acting
unilaterally seems costly in the short run, if it helps lead to
new rules, norms, or institutions the hegemon favors, then
it might pay off in the long term.
The United States’ response to the 9/11 terror attacks is
instructive on this point. The Bush administration deliberately eschewed the most rule-based responses, such as
demanding that the Taliban regime turn Osama bin Laden
over to the International Court of Justice or suffer UN sanctions. Instead, it opted for an ultimatum backed up by a
threat to invade Afghanistan. Although there were numerous ways to justify the invasion in terms of settled international law, the administration chose instead to act under
an expanded definition of self-defense that encompassed
attacks on countries that harbor terrorists.86 It did not request
a UN Security Council resolution specifically authorizing
the invasion, but reached for something far bolder: Resolution 1373, which endorsed the new general rule legalizing the use of force against states that harbor terrorists and
transformed a raft of U.S.-sponsored antiterrorism measures into formal international commitments legally binding on all member states. This was widely seen as an effort
to revise accepted customary international law in a manner
that advantages the United States, which has the military
capacity to attack nearly anywhere, and potentially disadvantages weaker states, which lack such capabilities and could
find themselves accused of harboring terrorists and thus subject to lawful invasion by the powerful. The United States,
in short, exploited the unusual circumstances surrounding
the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as
well as its go-it-alone power to push through a new rule
that opened the door for a wider range of actions that could
eventually be seen as legitimate.
The connection between unilateralism and legitimacy is,
in short, complex and uncertain. What makes it now seem
straightforward and obvious to so many constructivists and
other analysts is not insight from scholarship, but hindsight over the Iraq war.The problem with using Iraq to demonstrate the legitimacy costs of unilateralism is that many
other aspects of the case besides its perceived unilateral nature
are obviously corrosive of legitimacy. Unlike the war in
Afghanistan, the war in Iraq came to be seen by many as
producing not a public good, but a major public bad. Moreover, the administration sought to promulgate a much more
dramatic rule change—the Bush Doctrine of preventive
war—that was more threatening to other actors’ core security interests. Although it engaged in some efforts at consultation and persuasion with allies concerning the decision

for war, this was not done for the most part through direct
personal interactions. And consultation was almost nonexistent concerning the rule change the Bush administration
was propounding. One French diplomat recalled that in the
old days, high-level U.S. officials would travel to Paris for
extensive consultations over any new NATO doctrine, even
though it was clear that the change had been approved in
Washington and no further substantive alterations were possible. “We found out about the Bush Doctrine by downloading it from the White House website,” he noted. “The
Doctrine has much to recommend it, but that is not the
way to communicate with allies.”
Scholars and analysts may well believe that they could
have predicted that Iraq would sap U.S. legitimacy. However, even if this is true, it tells us little about the prospective legitimacy consequences of other unilateral acts that
do not have as many overlapping factors all pointing in
the direction of reduced legitimacy. In short, neither constructivists nor other IR scholars have specified and evaluated hypotheses about the sets of conditions and types of
unilateral acts that are most likely to corrode legitimacy,
or the degree to which compensating strategies might mitigate the legitimacy costs of unilateralism.87 As a result,
there are as yet no scholarly grounds for determining ex
ante the legitimacy costs of anticipated unilateralism.

Conclusion
Ultimately, much of the scholarly criticism directed at
George W. Bush’s foreign policy decisions is motivated by
their substance rather than the procedure followed to implement them. But IR scholarship, which generally reflects a
search for universal, systematic knowledge rather than
insights into the details of specific policy matters, largely
provides weak leverage on policy substance. As a result,
recent scholarly criticism has gravitated toward the procedural issue of unilateralism, on whose general costs it is
thought—wrongly, we have shown—that IR scholarship
does offer leverage.
The propensity to criticize unilateral policies does appear
to vary with the substance at issue. When the substance
was different—as in Kosovo—the membership and size of
the cast of critics was different as well. This suggests that if
Bush had, for example, unilaterally increased aid to the
developing world, lowered barriers to the exports of developing countries, reduced nuclear stockpiles, limited greenhouse gas emissions, or pursued humanitarian intervention
on the Kosovo model, it is unlikely that his actions would
have attracted the outpouring of criticism on procedural
grounds.
This is not to impugn all scholarly criticisms of unilateral U.S. policies. Rather, it is to insist upon clearly distinguishing between criticisms of procedure and those of
substance, and to recognize the weakness of current procedural arguments. Scholarly criticism leading up to the

Iraq war, for example, fell roughly into three categories:
those focused primarily on the merits of the policy given
the specific details of the situation (implicitly acknowledging IR theory’s lack of purchase); 88 those that mixed assessments of case-specific costs and benefits with theoretically
derived assessments of the expected costs of unilateralism; 89 and those focused mainly on the general procedural criticism based on theoretically derived estimates of
unilateralism’s expected costs.90 Only the first approach is
currently defensible intellectually.
The story need not end here. Unilateralism may well
have general costs that IR theory could identify if it were
developed further. Indeed, for each theoretical school, there
are obvious next steps for researchers. Research in the realist tradition, for example, might have a great deal to add if
it paid more attention to how great-power bargaining
occurs in today’s unipolar system. Institutionalist scholarship could usefully develop a more finely grained understanding of reputation and coordination costs, as well as
focus in more detail on how power asymmetries influence
bargaining over and within international institutions.
Finally, it would be useful to develop theory and research
along constructivist lines on why some forms of unilateralism impose more legitimacy costs than others and the
degree to which a hegemon can mitigate the legitimacy
costs of going it alone by deploying compensating strategies.
In short, the fact that IR scholarship currently cannot
identify general costs of unilateralism does not mean that
it will never do so. Its shortcomings in this regard may be
an artifact of slow updating. “Instead of radical change,”
Jack Snyder notes, “academia has adjusted existing theories to meet new realities.” 91 When confronted with novel
explanatory challenges, scholars’ first step is naturally to
exploit old findings and concepts in search of answers.
With nearly fifteen years’ experience in a novel unipolar
system, however, it is clearly time to develop new concepts
and evaluate them against recent evidence. IR scholars
thus have much work ahead of them. Given that there is
every reason to expect that unipolarity—and hence the
temptations of unilateralism—will last for a long time,
they also have a strong incentive to do so. Unless and until
such updating occurs, however, scholarly grounds for a
general stance against U.S. unilateralism on the basis of its
purported international costs do not exist.
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